“In Syria, everyone is fighting everyone — except the people who should be fighting each other.”
Introduction
Imagine a country where the government is backed by Russia and Iran. Where the rebels are backed by the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia — but those three countries don’t fully trust each other. Where a terrorist group called ISIS fights the government but also fights the rebels. Where a Kurdish militia is simultaneously an ally of the United States and an enemy of Turkey — which is also a US ally. Where a rebel group changes its name three times to avoid being designated a terrorist organization — even though everyone knows it’s the same group.
Welcome to Syria.
The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, is not really a civil war. It is a proxy war — a conflict where outside powers fight each other using local groups as their weapons. Syria became the arena where Russia, Iran, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel all pursued their interests, using Syrian lives as the currency.
By the time Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow in late 2024, over 500,000 Syrians had died, 13 million had been displaced, and the country had been reduced to rubble. And the outside powers that caused much of this destruction were already calculating their next moves.
This is the story of how Syria became the world’s most complicated war — and what it means for the future of the Middle East.
Who Is Bashar al-Assad and How Did Syria Get Here?
Bashar al-Assad became President of Syria in 2000, inheriting power from his father Hafez al-Assad, who had ruled Syria with an iron fist since 1971. The Assad family belongs to the Alawite sect — a minority Shia-affiliated group that makes up only about 12% of Syria’s population, in a country that is 74% Sunni Muslim.
This demographic reality is crucial. The Assad regime was a minority government ruling a Sunni majority country — and it maintained power through a combination of brutal repression, a powerful security apparatus, and strategic alliances with other minorities (Christians, Druze) who feared what a Sunni majority government might do to them.
When the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East in 2010-2011 — a wave of popular uprisings against authoritarian governments — Syria was not immune. In March 2011, protesters took to the streets in the southern city of Daraa, demanding political reforms. Assad’s response was to shoot them.
That decision transformed a protest movement into an armed rebellion. And once the guns came out, every outside power with an interest in Syria began choosing sides.
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 2000 | Bashar al-Assad becomes president |
| 2011 | Arab Spring — protests begin in Daraa |
| 2011 | Assad cracks down violently — rebellion begins |
| 2011 | Free Syrian Army (FSA) formed |
| 2012 | Al-Nusra Front emerges |
| 2013 | ISIS enters Syria from Iraq |
| 2014 | US officially enters Syrian conflict |
| 2015 | Russia officially enters Syrian conflict |
| 2019 | ISIS loses territorial control |
| 2019 | HTS (formerly Al-Nusra) fills vacuum |
| 2024 | HTS-led offensive — Assad flees to Russia |
The Proxy Map: Who Is Fighting for Whom and Why
Before we go further, let’s map out the players. Syria’s war is confusing because there are so many groups, and their relationships keep shifting. But at the highest level, there are two sides:
Side A: Assad’s Supporters
- Russia (air power, ground troops from 2015)
- Iran (IRGC troops, funding, weapons)
- Hezbollah (Lebanese Shia militia)
- PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party — for its own reasons)
Side B: Assad’s Opponents
- United States (supports SDF, YPG, FSA)
- Turkey (supports FSA/Syrian National Army; opposes YPG)
- Gulf Cooperation Council — GCC (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman)
- Israel (covert operations, airstrikes on Iranian assets)
The Wild Cards:
- ISIS (fought everyone, but primarily Assad)
- Al-Nusra Front / HTS (fought Assad, received indirect US/Turkey/GCC support)
SYRIA'S PROXY WAR MAP
RUSSIA + IRAN + HEZBOLLAH
|
| Support
v
BASHAR AL-ASSAD
(Syrian Government)
|
| Fights
v
┌────────────────────────────────────┐
│ REBEL GROUPS │
│ - Free Syrian Army (FSA) │<── USA + Turkey + GCC
│ - Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) │<── USA
│ - YPG (Kurdish) │<── USA (not Turkey)
│ - Al-Nusra / HTS │<── Indirect USA/Turkey/GCC
└────────────────────────────────────┘
|
| Also fighting Assad
v
ISIS <── (Created by conditions of US Iraq War)
Assad’s Supporters: Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, PKK
Russia entered the Syrian conflict officially in September 2015, when it began airstrikes in support of Assad. Russia’s interest in Syria is strategic: Syria hosts Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean — at Tartus. Losing Assad would mean losing that base, and losing Russia’s only warm-water port with direct access to the Mediterranean Sea.
Russia also had a narrative interest: it wanted to demonstrate that it could protect its allies, unlike the United States, which had abandoned Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Supporting Assad was a message to every Russian ally in the world: we don’t abandon our friends.
Iran supported Assad for a different reason: the Shia Crescent. Iran’s strategic vision is to maintain a continuous arc of Shia influence from Tehran through Iraq, through Syria, to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria is the critical link in this chain. Without Assad, Iran loses its land route for supplying weapons to Hezbollah.
Iran deployed its IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) troops to Syria, funded Assad’s military, and organized Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to fight for Assad.
Hezbollah — the Lebanese Shia militant group and political party — sent thousands of fighters to Syria. For Hezbollah, Assad’s survival was existential: Iran supplies Hezbollah’s weapons through Syria. No Assad = no weapons supply = weakened Hezbollah.
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) supported Assad for a completely different reason: animosity toward Turkey. Turkey has been fighting the PKK for decades, viewing Kurdish nationalism as a threat to its territorial integrity. The PKK supported Assad simply because Assad was Turkey’s enemy. The enemy of my enemy is my friend.
Assad’s Opponents: USA, Turkey, Gulf States and Their Proxies
The United States, Turkey, and the Gulf states all wanted Assad gone — but for different reasons, and they didn’t always agree on how to do it.
The United States wanted Assad removed because he was an Iranian ally, a Russian client, and a brutal dictator who had used chemical weapons against his own people. The US supported several groups:
- YPG (People’s Defense Units) — a Kurdish militia that became America’s most effective partner against ISIS
- SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) — an umbrella group that includes YPG plus Arab, Assyrian, and Turkmen fighters
- FSA (Free Syrian Army) — the original rebel group, formed by defectors from Assad’s army
Turkey wanted Assad gone because Assad was allied with the PKK — Turkey’s mortal enemy. But Turkey had a problem: the United States was supporting the YPG, which Turkey considered an extension of the PKK. This created a bizarre situation where two NATO allies — the US and Turkey — were supporting groups that were enemies of each other.
Turkey supported the FSA (later renamed the Syrian National Army) — a more moderate rebel coalition that Turkey could control and that was not Kurdish.
The Gulf Cooperation Council — particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar — wanted Assad gone because he was an Iranian ally, and Iran is the Gulf states’ primary rival. Saudi Arabia and Qatar funded various rebel groups, including some that were more Islamist in orientation.
THE CONTRADICTION AT THE HEART OF THE ANTI-ASSAD COALITION
USA supports YPG ──────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
Turkey (NATO ally of USA) considers YPG = PKK = terrorist |
|
Turkey supports FSA/Syrian National Army |
|
YPG and FSA sometimes fight each other |
|
Result: US and Turkey, both opposing Assad, |
are effectively supporting groups that fight each other ────┘
ISIS: The Monster That Ate the War
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) — also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or simply Daesh — emerged in Syria in 2013. It was not a new organization. It was a rebranding.
ISIS grew out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) — the Al-Qaeda affiliate that had been fighting US forces in Iraq since 2003. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and dissolved the Iraqi Army, hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers suddenly had no jobs, no income, and a burning grievance. Many joined radical groups. AQI was one of them.
When the Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011, AQI saw an opportunity. It crossed the border into Syria, rebranded itself as ISIS, and began seizing territory in the chaos of the civil war.
By 2014, ISIS controlled a territory the size of the United Kingdom, spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq. It declared a Caliphate — an Islamic state governed by strict Sharia law — with its capital in Raqqa, Syria.
Here is the most revealing fact about ISIS in Syria: ISIS primarily fought Assad’s forces, not the US-backed rebels.
Think about that. ISIS was supposedly America’s enemy. The US-backed rebels were supposedly fighting Assad. So ISIS and the US-backed rebels had the same enemy. And yet ISIS rarely attacked US-backed groups. It focused almost entirely on Assad.
Donald Trump, in a campaign speech, said: “Hillary Clinton and Obama created ISIS.”
This is an oversimplification, but it contains a kernel of truth. The US government’s actions — specifically the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, and the power vacuum created in both Iraq and Syria — created the conditions in which ISIS could emerge and thrive.
HOW ISIS EMERGED
2003: US invades Iraq, dissolves Iraqi Army
|
v
Hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers unemployed + angry
|
v
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) recruits them
|
v
2011: Syrian Civil War creates power vacuum
|
v
AQI crosses into Syria, rebrands as ISIS
|
v
2014: ISIS declares Caliphate in Raqqa
|
v
ISIS fights Assad (not US proxies)
|
v
2019: ISIS defeated by SDF (backed by US)
ISIS was finally defeated in March 2019, when the SDF — backed by US airpower — captured the last ISIS-held territory in eastern Syria. The “Caliphate” was over.
But ISIS was not destroyed. It went underground, reverting to an insurgency. And the power vacuum it left behind was quickly filled by other groups.
The Rebranding Game: Al-Nusra → Jabhat Fatah al-Sham → HTS
While ISIS was grabbing headlines, another Al-Qaeda affiliate was quietly building power in Syria: Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra).
Al-Nusra emerged in 2012 as Al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate. It was more disciplined than ISIS, more focused on fighting Assad, and more willing to work with other rebel groups. This made it useful to the US, Turkey, and Gulf states — even though it was officially designated a terrorist organization.
Here is the uncomfortable truth: some factions of the US-backed FSA worked alongside Al-Nusra. The logic was simple: Al-Nusra was effective at fighting Assad, and the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
Over the years, Al-Nusra went through a series of rebranding exercises:
| Year | Name | Reason for Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | Al-Nusra Front | Original name, Al-Qaeda affiliate |
| 2016 | Jabhat Fatah al-Sham | Officially broke from Al-Qaeda (claimed) |
| 2017 | Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) | Merged with other groups, new brand |
Each rebranding was an attempt to distance the group from the Al-Qaeda label — to make it more palatable to Western and regional supporters, and to recruit from a broader pool of fighters who might be hesitant to join an Al-Qaeda affiliate.
The leader throughout all these rebranding exercises was Abu Muhammad al-Julani — a Syrian jihadist who had fought with Al-Qaeda in Iraq before returning to Syria. He is the man whose face became famous worldwide when HTS led the offensive that toppled Assad.
Does US intelligence know about al-Julani and HTS? Of course. They know everything. And yet the US has not moved decisively against HTS — because HTS is fighting Assad, and Assad is Iran’s ally, and Iran is America’s adversary.
THE REBRANDING CYCLE
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
|
| Crosses into Syria 2011
v
Al-Nusra Front (2012) <── Al-Qaeda affiliate
|
| Rebrands to distance from Al-Qaeda
v
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (2016) <── "Broke from Al-Qaeda"
|
| Merges with other groups
v
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham / HTS (2017) <── Current name
|
| Leader: Abu Muhammad al-Julani
v
Leads offensive that topples Assad (2024)
The Fall of Assad: How HTS Took Syria
In late 2024, HTS launched a stunning military offensive that caught Assad’s forces completely off guard. Within weeks, HTS and allied rebel groups had captured Aleppo — Syria’s second-largest city — then Hama, then Homs, and finally Damascus.
On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria and sought asylum in Moscow. The Assad family’s 54-year grip on Syria was over.
How did this happen so fast? Several factors converged:
- Russia was distracted — bogged down in Ukraine, Russia had reduced its military presence in Syria
- Hezbollah was weakened — Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon in 2024 had severely degraded Hezbollah’s capabilities
- Iran was stretched — dealing with its own internal pressures and the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 attack
- Assad’s army was exhausted — after 13 years of civil war, morale was low and defections were high
- HTS had learned — 13 years of fighting had made HTS a disciplined, experienced military force
The speed of the collapse was reminiscent of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 — a reminder that authoritarian governments, no matter how brutal, can collapse with stunning speed when their external backers withdraw support.
What Comes Next: HTS vs Syrian National Army
Assad is gone. But Syria’s war is not over.
Two main forces now compete for Syria’s future:
HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) — controls most of northwestern Syria, including Idlib and now Damascus. Islamist in orientation, with roots in Al-Qaeda. Al-Julani has been trying to moderate HTS’s image, presenting himself as a pragmatic leader rather than a jihadist.
Syrian National Army (SNA) — formerly the Free Syrian Army, backed by Turkey. Controls parts of northern Syria near the Turkish border. More moderate than HTS, but also includes some Islamist factions.
These two groups have both fought Assad and have sometimes cooperated. But they have fundamentally different visions for Syria’s future — and they will fight for supremacy.
SYRIA'S FUTURE: TWO COMPETING VISIONS
HTS (al-Julani) Syrian National Army
───────────────────────── ──────────────────────────
Islamist roots (Al-Qaeda) More moderate, pro-Turkey
Controls Damascus + northwest Controls northern border areas
Wants Islamic governance Wants secular/moderate state
Backed by: Qatar (indirect) Backed by: Turkey
Suspicious of Turkey Dependent on Turkey
RESULT: Inevitable power struggle for Syria's future
The Israel Angle: Why Assad’s Fall Benefits Netanyahu
There is one more player in this story that rarely gets enough attention: Israel.
Israel has been conducting covert military operations in Syria for years — airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments, attacks on Hezbollah infrastructure, assassinations of Iranian commanders. Israel’s goal has been to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent military presence in Syria and to prevent Hezbollah from receiving advanced weapons.
Assad’s fall is a strategic windfall for Israel:
- Iran loses its land route to Hezbollah — without Assad, Iran cannot easily ship weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon
- Hezbollah is already weakened — Israel’s 2024 campaign in Lebanon killed Hezbollah’s top leadership and degraded its military capabilities
- Hamas is weakened — Israel’s campaign in Gaza following October 7, 2023 has significantly degraded Hamas’s military capabilities
- Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” is fractured — the network of Iran-backed groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, Iraqi militias) that was Iran’s primary tool of regional influence has been severely damaged
Here is the most revealing fact: ISIS and HTS have never attacked Israel, despite being less than 100 km from Damascus — and despite anti-Israel rhetoric being a standard feature of Islamist ideology.
This is not an accident. It strongly suggests that these groups have some form of understanding with — or at least tolerance from — the United States and Israel. Groups that are genuinely hostile to Israel do not operate 100 km from its border for years without attacking it.
Key Takeaways
-
Syria is a proxy war — the real conflict is between Russia/Iran on one side and the US/Turkey/Gulf states on the other. Syrians are the victims.
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ISIS was a product of US policy in Iraq — the 2003 invasion and dissolution of the Iraqi Army created the conditions for ISIS to emerge.
-
Groups rebrand to avoid terrorist designations — Al-Nusra became HTS, but the ideology and leadership remained largely the same.
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The US indirectly supported groups it officially designated as terrorists — through the FSA’s cooperation with Al-Nusra.
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Assad’s fall benefits Israel — Iran loses its weapons supply route to Hezbollah.
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HTS and the Syrian National Army will now fight each other — the war is not over, just entering a new phase.
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Russia’s distraction in Ukraine was a key factor — without Russian air support, Assad’s forces could not hold.
Why This Matters Today
Syria’s war has reshaped the Middle East in ways that will take decades to fully understand.
The fall of Assad has weakened Iran’s regional influence more than any military strike could have. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” — the network of proxy forces it spent 40 years building — has been severely damaged. Hezbollah is weakened. Hamas is weakened. The land route through Syria is gone.
But the vacuum left by Assad is dangerous. HTS is not a democratic movement. Al-Julani may be presenting a moderate face to the world, but HTS’s roots are in Al-Qaeda. The Syrian National Army is fragmented and dependent on Turkey. ISIS is still present as an insurgency.
Syria could easily become another Libya — a failed state where multiple armed factions fight indefinitely, with no central government capable of restoring order.
The 13 million Syrians who were displaced by this war — the largest refugee crisis since World War II — are watching to see if they can go home. For most of them, the answer is still unclear.
Glossary
| Term | Simple Explanation |
|---|---|
| HTS | Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — the rebel group that toppled Assad, formerly Al-Nusra Front, with roots in Al-Qaeda |
| FSA | Free Syrian Army — the original rebel group formed in 2011 by defectors from Assad’s army; now called Syrian National Army |
| SDF | Syrian Democratic Forces — a US-backed umbrella group of Kurdish, Arab, and other fighters; primary force that defeated ISIS |
| YPG | People’s Defense Units — the Kurdish militia that forms the backbone of the SDF; considered a terrorist group by Turkey |
| PKK | Kurdistan Workers’ Party — Kurdish militant group fighting for autonomy in Turkey; considered a terrorist group by Turkey and the US |
| IRGC | Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — Iran’s ideological military force, deployed to Syria to support Assad |
| Hezbollah | Lebanese Shia militant group and political party, backed by Iran; sent thousands of fighters to support Assad |
| ISIS/ISIL/Daesh | Islamic State — jihadist group that declared a Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2014; defeated territorially in 2019 |
| Al-Nusra Front | Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, founded in 2012; later rebranded as HTS |
| Proxy war | A conflict where outside powers fight each other using local groups as their weapons, avoiding direct confrontation |
| Caliphate | An Islamic state governed by a Caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad) under strict Sharia law |
| Rojava | The autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria, controlled by the YPG/SDF |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman |
| Jabhat Fatah al-Sham | The intermediate name of Al-Nusra Front after it claimed to break from Al-Qaeda in 2016 |
| Abu Muhammad al-Julani | The leader of HTS, who led the offensive that toppled Assad |
| Alawite | A minority Shia-affiliated sect in Syria; the Assad family belongs to this group |
| Arab Spring | The wave of popular uprisings against authoritarian governments that swept the Arab world in 2010-2011 |
This article is based on publicly available geopolitical analysis. All views expressed are analytical in nature.
Power and Pelf 